A financial investigation into the Viskeuringsinstituut (VKI) has uncovered several shortcomings in the financial management, internal control and governance structure of the institute. Currency conversions through private bank accounts, risks of conflicts of interest, unclear payment authorities and a years-long backlog in audited annual accounts are among the main findings.
It emerges from a report by Vliet Accountants & Consultants N.V. dated July 10, 2026, obtained by Key News. The investigation concerns the 2024 and 2025 financial years and was carried out on behalf of the current Raad van Toezicht (RvT, Supervisory Board).
According to the investigators, several material shortcomings were identified during the period under review in compliance with the statutes, formal decision-making and internal controls. Although a significant part of the investigated cash flows could be traced administratively and approvals were available for many transactions, clear policy rules and documented control procedures were lacking in various areas.
The Viskeuringsinstituut performs an important public task within Suriname’s fisheries sector. The institute is responsible for monitoring the quality and food safety of fisheries and aquaculture products and carries out inspections, certifications and laboratory testing, among other duties. According to the investigation report, reliability and transparency are therefore essential to the confidence of international trading partners.
Currency transactions through private bank accounts
One of the most notable findings concerns the use of private bank accounts for currency conversions on behalf of the VKI.
The transactions examined show that a total of USD 816.100 was converted into Surinamese dollars through three individuals involved in 2024 and 2025. The SRD amounts actually received were collectively SRD 1.648.693 lower than the equivalent value calculated according to the reference rates of the Centrale Bank van Suriname (CBvS, Central Bank of Suriname).
The largest exchange-rate difference, SRD 889.187, was identified in transactions involving H.J. de Vries. Currency exchanges by the former director involved SRD 610.716, while transactions by the former financial manager involved SRD 148.790.
The investigators found that approvals from the Raad van Toezicht were available for a significant portion of the transactions. However, no formal exchange-rate agreements, treasury policy or other documents were found in which the exchange rates used and working method were adequately recorded.
The report emphasises that the calculated exchange-rate difference cannot automatically be regarded as a financial loss. The investigators did not establish whether the VKI could actually have exchanged the currency at CBvS rates on the respective transaction dates.
Nor was it investigated whether other market rates were available. The investigators do note that the absence of formal agreements entailed risks for transparency and oversight of financial transactions.
Risks of conflicts of interest
The governance structure of the VKI also raises questions, according to the investigation. It was established that a member of the Raad van Toezicht, during part of the investigation period, fulfilled several roles within and in relation to the institute. He was not only a supervisor, but also an authorised signatory and, as an entrepreneur, a client of VKI services.
The investigators point out that this combination of functions and business interests entails an increased risk of conflicts of interest.
No formal integrity regulations, declarations concerning possible conflicts of interest or other documents were found showing how these risks were managed.
In addition, transactions were investigated with companies with which a family relationship with a former existed. These included payments to GRU Smart Business Consulting and E.J. Import.
The investigation did not demonstrate that unauthorised payments or unauthorised transactions took place in these situations. The investigators primarily identify the absence of demonstrable measures to prevent possible conflicts of interest.
Supervisor also received compensation for work in financial department
Another point of attention concerns the position of another RvT member who is named in the report.
According to the report, she was appointed from January 15, 2025, for a period of one year to support the VKI’s financial department. At the same time, she was a member of the Raad van Toezicht.
The payment documentation shows that she received USD 1.860 in 2025 for her supervisory role and an additional USD 7.140 for her work in the financial department. This amounts to a total of USD 9.000 in compensation for both functions.
The investigators found that no formal documents were found demonstrating that the combination of functions had been assessed beforehand for possible conflicts of interest or that specific measures had been taken to mitigate such risks.
It was established, however, that the RvT member was not an authorised signatory and that no indications were found that she independently approved payments or entered into financial obligations on behalf of the institute.
According to the report, the simultaneous fulfilment of a supervisory and executive role entails governance risks, particularly when the separation between supervision and execution is not formally established.
Financial transactions for food safety institute
The investigation also focused on financial transactions between the VKI and the Nationaal Instituut voor Voedselveiligheid Suriname (NIVS, National Institute for Food Safety Suriname).
It was established that the VKI had advanced or paid various costs on behalf of the NIVS.
Although explanations were available for part of these transactions, no complete formal agreements or board decisions were found setting out the financial arrangements, approvals and cost settlement.
According to the investigators, it could therefore not be established for all transactions examined whether the costs had been settled correctly between the two institutions.
The NIVS is a separate organisation. Precisely for that reason, a clear separation of financial responsibilities is necessary, according to the report.
Uncertainty over payment authorities
Shortcomings were also identified in the authorisation of payments.
A signature card from the Surinaamse Postspaarbank dated August 2024 shows that the former director could independently authorise payments up to SRD 10.000 or USD 3.000.
However, according to the VKI statutes, prior written approval from the Raad van Toezicht was required for certain transactions involving movable property above SRD 10.000.
Because of the difference between this threshold and the banking authorisation limit of USD 3.000, payments could take place that, under bank rules, the director was allowed to approve independently, while the statutes prescribed additional approval for certain transactions.
The investigators found that a formal arrangement was lacking in which the banking authorities and statutory provisions were clearly aligned.
No deviations were identified, incidentally, in the authorisations found for the transactions examined through the SRD bank account.
VKI without final audited annual accounts for years
Another important finding concerns the backlog in financial reporting. The most recent final audited annual accounts found by the investigators related to the 2020 financial year.
Draft annual accounts had been prepared for the 2021 through 2024 financial years, but these had not yet been finally adopted and provided with an auditor’s report during the investigation period.
This means that the management and the Raad van Toezicht had to rely on draft figures for several years in their financial assessment.
According to the investigators, such a situation may limit the transparency of financial reporting and the quality of financial oversight.
Raad van Toezicht not in accordance with statutory composition
The composition of the Raad van Toezicht also did not comply with the statutory provisions in 2024 and 2025. According to Article 8 of the statutes, the board must consist of a minimum of five and a maximum of seven members. Throughout the entire investigation period, however, the board had only three members.
The statutes do provide that an incomplete Raad van Toezicht may continue to operate lawfully as long as it consists of at least three members. The investigators therefore do not find that the board was unauthorised, but do note that the prescribed minimum composition was not achieved during both years.
The available documentation also does not show that concrete steps were taken during that period to fill the vacant positions.
Shortcomings in receivables management
The investigation also uncovered problems in the collection of outstanding receivables. The investigators found increasing outstanding balances among several major debtors. For the 2024 financial year, no reminder letters, notices of default or other documents were found showing that systematic collection measures had been taken.
According to the report, it was only towards the end of 2025 that debtors with payment arrears began to be approached in writing.
According to the investigators, the absence of systematic receivables management created the risk that outstanding amounts would remain unpaid for longer and that the institute’s liquidity position would come under pressure.
No full audit
Vliet Accountants & Consultants emphasises that the investigation does not constitute a comprehensive audit or assurance engagement.
The work was risk-focused and concerned selected transactions, documents, authorities and governance processes.
No assurance is therefore provided regarding the completeness, accuracy or legality of the VKI’s entire financial administration.
The investigators do establish that the transactions examined could largely be traced administratively and that authorisations were available for a significant portion of the payments.
At the same time, according to the report, formal procedures necessary for demonstrable and transparent financial governance were lacking in several areas.
Investigators recommend improvements
Following the findings, the investigators advise the VKI to adopt, among other things, an integrated governance and integrity policy.
They also recommend a formal authority framework, clear procedures for tenders and procurement, treasury policy for currency transactions and structured receivables management.
According to the report, the administrative organisation must also be strengthened so that decisions, approvals and financial transactions are better documented.
The findings raise questions about the quality of oversight of the VKI during the 2024 and 2025 financial years and the responsibility of the directors and supervisors involved.
For the time being, it is not clear from the report to what extent the identified shortcomings have since been remedied and what governance measures have been taken in response to the investigation results.
Key News will ask the individuals and bodies involved for a response to the findings in the investigation report. Any responses and additional information will be included in a follow-up publication.







